The recent transfer of Anthony Elanga from Nottingham Forest to Newcastle United has sent ripples through the football world, underscoring the intricate dynamics of the modern transfer market. The Swedish winger's move north represents Newcastle's first significant signing of the summer, making him their third most expensive player ever, following teammates Alexander Isak and Sandro Tonali.

Forest, however, haven't walked away empty-handed. Despite losing a player who directly contributed to 17 goals or assists last season, they've pocketed a club-record £52 million fee—a figure that may soon be surpassed by Morgan Gibbs-White's potential £60 million transfer to Tottenham Hotspur.

Yet, beneath this headline lies another story of missed opportunities, particularly at Manchester United. Just two seasons prior, United sold Elanga to Forest for £15 million. The winger's subsequent success has allowed Forest to more than triple that amount, despite United securing a 15% sell-on clause estimated around £5 million.

This sale exemplifies a broader trend at Manchester United—an inability to maximize player sales. At the close of March 2024, the club owed over £300 million in net transfer fees to other clubs, reflecting their heavy investment but also poor selling practices. Over the last decade, United’s cumulative profit on player sales totals just £174.2 million, significantly trailing Chelsea (£842.8 million) and Manchester City (£583.7 million).

When considering how much clubs potentially "lose" from future transfers, the spotlight shines brightly on United. Since 2015, their cumulative lost fees are calculated at £272.5 million, ranking second highest in England. A considerable chunk (£89 million) comes from the well-publicised saga involving Paul Pogba, who left United as a free agent only to return for a massive fee four years later.

While Pogba's case is unique, even excluding it still leaves United high on the list of clubs missing out significantly in future transfers. Interestingly, they sit alongside Chelsea and Manchester City, the most profitable sellers who paradoxically also "lose" substantial potential earnings.

Manchester City tops this counterintuitive list because of their robust academy system. The club's wealth of talent means many youngsters inevitably move on without first-team experience, limiting immediate transfer fees. A prime example is Jamie Gittens, who departed City for Borussia Dortmund at minimal cost, only to later transfer to Chelsea for £48.5 million. Similarly, City earned substantial sell-on revenue from Jadon Sancho’s sale to United, despite initially selling him cheaply.

City’s losses are thus reflective not of poor decisions but of their overflowing talent pool, necessitating the release of promising players who flourish elsewhere.

Chelsea’s case is somewhat different. Despite excellent overall sales figures, they have notably let go of players who dramatically increased in value after leaving Stamford Bridge. Kevin De Bruyne and Mohamed Salah stand out, with combined future sales generating over £60 million more than Chelsea received for them.

While it’s speculative to suggest Chelsea would have replicated their future successes, it remains clear these transfers represented considerable lost potential revenue.

Outside England’s elite, clubs like Birmingham City and Sheffield United vividly demonstrate football’s structural inequalities. Birmingham sold brothers Jude and Jobe Bellingham for relatively modest fees, only to watch their values soar. Similarly, Sheffield United could only secure limited fees for Kyle Walker and Harry Maguire at young ages, losing out on substantial future revenues when those players later commanded premium fees.

Globally, clubs like France’s Rennes and Italy’s Inter Milan underscore similar patterns. Rennes notably "lost" around £100 million when Ousmane Dembele moved from Dortmund to Barcelona. Inter sold Philippe Coutinho cheaply to Liverpool, who later turned a massive profit selling him to Barcelona.

South American clubs, facing limited leverage, also frequently miss out on large future fees. Brazil's Santos and São Paulo had little chance of commanding fees reflecting Neymar and Antony’s eventual market values.

These cases illuminate football’s inherent market hierarchy. Elite clubs stockpile talent, often releasing promising players at lower initial prices who subsequently realize greater values elsewhere. Meanwhile, smaller clubs, constrained by limited negotiating power, accept modest initial offers, sometimes supplemented by valuable sell-on clauses.

Ultimately, Anthony Elanga’s transfer exemplifies football’s complex economic ecosystem—a chain where every transfer holds consequences far beyond immediate headlines.